

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR  
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

15 June 1981

NOTE FOR: A/NIO/SP

Ray:

You already have the "formal piece" the  
Director mentions. I've attached a copy.



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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT****Routing Slip**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/DCI/RM				
4	DD/NFA	X			
5	D/DCI/CT				
6	DD/A				
7	DD/O				
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/PPPM				
16	AO/DCI				
17	PB/NSC				
18	CH/NIC		X		
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SUSPENSE		18 June			
		Date			

Remarks:

Recommendation, please, to DCI on how to proceed.


*[Signature]*  
Executive Secretary  
11 June 81

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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June 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The Soviet ABM Program

In the course of recent interdepartmental meetings on SALT, it has become clear that serious uncertainties and differences of view exist both within the Intelligence Community and elsewhere in the Administration over the purpose and scope of Soviet research and development efforts in the ABM area. These uncertainties and differences have an important bearing on Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty and associated agreements, particularly the Agreed Statement on concurrent testing of ABM and air defense components of November, 1978. Some consider the analysis of the Intelligence Community to be inadequate.

Soviet ABM efforts are of critical concern to us because of the potentially severe consequences of a potential Soviet denunciation of the ABM Treaty and "breakout" from its limitations.

In view of the need to begin immediately to review the U.S. position on ABM both in the context of our own strategic programs and in connection with ongoing interagency consideration of SALT issues (including the ABM Treaty review due in 1982), it would be most helpful if you could take initiatives to create a high-level interagency review and assessment of the Soviet ABM effort. This review should involve a fresh examination of assumptions utilized within the Community in studying ABM-related issues, and should provide a thorough airing of interagency differences. It should give full weight to open source as well as classified material, and should consider in depth the question of Soviet strategic doctrine as it pertains to Soviet activities in the ABM area.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

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Review June 8, 1987

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese

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